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RELIGIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS TO
THE BIOETHICS DEBATE:
UTILIZING LEGAL RIGHTS WHILE
AVOIDING SCIENTIFIC TEMPTATIONS
Steven Goldberg*
Religious communities and individuals of faith have much to
contribute to the debate on legal issues surrounding bioethics.
There is no constitutional problem with their participation in that
debate; indeed, constitutional principles protect the right to ex-
press religious viewpoints in the public square. The real question is
what will be said; will religion make a distinctive contribution to
the bioethics controversy, or will it merely echo the agenda and the
perspective of modern science?
I will begin by outlining the legal right of religious individuals
and groups to participate in legislative deliberations such as those
relating to bioethics. The interplay of free speech and the religion
clauses creates a favorable environment for robust public debate,
while the due process clause guarantees that religious values can be
passed on in religious schools. I will then turn to a general consid-
eration of what sorts of contributions people of faith might make.
Too often, it seems to me, they are seduced by science: eager to
talk as if the human genetic code is all that matters, while expres-
sing relatively little interest in vital nonscientific issues, like access
to medical care.' Whether it is an unconscious adoption of the no-
tion that only science is important, or simply an overwhelming de-
sire to be trendy, religious groups often miss the opportunity to
make a distinctive contribution to public debate.
Let us begin by looking at their right to participate in that de-
bate. The free speech clause in the United States Constitution pro-
tects religious speech every bit as much as it protects political
speech. No branch of the federal or state government can prevent
you from talking to your neighbor, writing an editorial, or emailing
your Congressman, no matter whether your views are widely
shared or yours alone. Moreover, the government cannot prevent
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. See generally STEVEN GOLDBERG, SEDUCED By SCIENCE: How AMERICAN
RELIGION HAS LOST ITS WAY (1999) (analyzing the risks when religion adopts a sci-
entific perspective).
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you from expressing Christian views any more than it can prevent
you from expressing utilitarian views. When the late Justice Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr. and the current Justice Antonin Scalia served
together on the United States Supreme Court they often disagreed,
but on this point they were in complete harmony. As Justice Bren-
nan wrote when the Court unanimously invalidated a law barring
clergy from holding political office, we cannot "place religious dis-
cussion, association, or political participation in a status less pre-
ferred than rights of discussion, association, and political
participation generally."' 2 Or, as Justice Scalia more recently held,
"a free-speech clause without religion would be Hamlet without
the prince." 3
The Constitution also protects the free exercise of religion. By
its nature, the practice of a religion cannot be as fully protected as
religious speech. When a religious practice, such as the use of the
hallucinogen peyote, conflicts with the law, the practice may have
to give way.4 But that is not the matter before us. When religious
speech is involved, the free exercise and free speech clauses point
in the same direction: against government censorship. Long before
Brennan and Scalia were Justices, a unanimous Supreme Court
made this clear. In 1940, the Court considered the case of Newton
Cantwell, a Jehovah's Witness, who had been convicted of breach
of the peace for expressing religious views that were quite unpopu-
lar in the neighborhood where he was preaching.5 The Court at
that time was quite diverse: it included conservatives like Justice
James C. McReynolds, centrists like Justice Harlan F. Stone, and
liberals like Justice William 0. Douglas. But the Court was unani-
mous in reversing Cantwell's conviction. Relying on free exercise
values and traditional free speech doctrine, the Court held that the
"state may not unduly suppress free communication of views, relig-
ious or other."6 Since there was no "clear and present danger to a
2. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 640 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment) (holding that statute disqualifying ministers from holding public office was
unconstitutional).
3. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995)
(holding that allowing a group to place a cross in a designated public forum did not
violate the First Amendment).
4. See Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) (holding statute prohibit-
ing use of peyote constitutional because the statute was not aimed at promoting or
restricting religious beliefs).
5. Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 301-03 (1940). Cantwell was also convicted of
soliciting without a license. Id.
6. Id. at 308.
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substantial interest of the State," Cantwell's speech, however un-
popular, had to be protected.7
There is another constitutional protection for religion that is less
well known but no less important than free speech and free exer-
cise. In 1925, the Supreme Court held, in Pierce v. Society of the
Sisters, that parents have a substantive due process right to send
their children to private schools, including parochial schools.8 The
case arose after Oregon enacted a law requiring that all children
between the ages of eight and sixteen attend public school. 9 The
unanimous Court held that, although states could mandate school
attendance, parents had a right to choose private schools if they
met state standards." The current Supreme Court has reaffirmed
this holding." Pierce has been called "almost certainly" the Su-
preme Court opinion "most supportive of the survival of religious
communities. ' 12 It permits those parents who so choose to enlist
parochial schools in the creation and maintenance of religious val-
ues, assuring that the next generation will have a informed basis if
they want to bring religious perspectives to bear in public debate
and in private choices.
Given the strong protection the free speech, free exercise, and
due process clauses give to the creation and expression of religious
viewpoints, it is something of a puzzle why so many people, across
the political spectrum, are uncertain about the right to present re-
ligious views in policy arguments. Most likely the confusion in the
public mind about this point stems from a misunderstanding of the
non-establishment of religion clause in the Constitution. Some
people, including supporters and opponents of traditional religion,
apparently believe that if a clergyman or a devout citizen presents
arguments based on religion in support of a bill, passage of that bill
would be an "establishment of religion." That has never been the
law. And thank goodness. Under that standard, theft and murder,
among many other things, would be lawful. Indeed, many of our
laws trace their origins to the Bible. Supreme Court Justice Sandra
7. Id. at 310-11.
8. Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
9. See WILLIAM G. Ross, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM, EDUCATION,
AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1917-1927, at 148-53 (1994) (outlining history of Oregon's
compulsory public education initiative).
10. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
11. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (holding that parents have a
constitutional right to decide who educates their children).
12. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON
LAW, RELIGION, AND LOYALTY 35 (1998).
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Day O'Connor, noting that numerous statutes blend secular and
religious elements, wrote that, "[c]haos would ensue if every such
statute were invalid under the Establishment Clause. 13
The dominant approach the Supreme Court has taken in this
area is to ask if a statute has a secular purpose. If it does, the
statute will be upheld even if it is based in part on religious val-
ues. 4 Thus the Court upheld the constitutionality of Sunday clos-
ing laws, even though they were religiously inspired, because they
also served valid secular purposes such as the protection of work-
ers.1 5 Now, of course, it can be difficult at times to determine if a
statue really has any secular purpose. 6 But this is unlikely to be a
problem in the bioethics area. Countless secular arguments, rang-
ing from economic productivity to health and safety concerns, have
already been raised on all sides of the debate over research in mod-
ern medicine. Under the circumstances, the Court is not likely to
find any plausible legislation in this area to be an establishment of
religion. After all, the Court has already declined to make such a
finding in the highly charged area of abortion. After the Court in
Roe v. Wade17 found that women had a substantive due process
right to abort early in pregnancy, Congress passed the Hyde
Amendment, prohibiting the use of federal funds to reimburse the
cost of abortions under Medicaid, except in narrow circum-
stances.18 The Amendment was challenged on the ground that it
was an unconstitutional establishment of religion because it was
based on the Roman Catholic view that life begins at conception.
When the Supreme Court rejected this argument, Justice Potter
Stewart's opinion for the Court made all of the arguments we have
discussed: he noted that the opposition of major religions to steal-
ing does not prohibit the state from outlawing theft, he pointed out
that Sunday closing laws had been upheld because they have a sec-
ular purpose, and he observed that there were secular opponents of
abortion who believe that the fetus should be protected from con-
ception. 9 So the Hyde Amendment was upheld.
13. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
14. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1204-06 (2d ed.
1988).
15. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 435-36, 445 (1961).
16. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56-57.
17. 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
18. See Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-439, tit. II, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1980).
19. Id. at 319-20. Other challenges to the Hyde Amendment failed as well.
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Thus religious organizations are perfectly free to participate fully
in the formation of policy in the field of bioethics. In doing so they
will join a vibrant American tradition. As Stephen L. Carter has
recently reminded us, "[t]he great social movement of the nine-
teenth century - the abolition of slavery - and the great social
movement of the twentieth - the abolition of legal racial segrega-
tion - were both nurtured in churches, publicly justified in religious
language, and unapologetically inspired by the Word of God."2 It
is, after all, the Reverend Martin Luther King that we revere to-
day. There is no reason to believe religion will not play a vital role
in the great social debates of the twenty-first century as well.
Of course, in a pluralistic society such as ours, no single religion,
not even all religions together, will or should be the sole determi-
nant of how we resolve deeply contested social issues. It is short
sighted and misguided for anyone to believe that they can play a
role in American politics without genuinely seeking common
ground with those of varying perspectives. And I recognize that
there is an important debate among political theorists about the
appropriate scope of explicitly religious arguments when public of-
ficials debate certain issues.21 But resolving social issues entirely
without the input of religious values is neither legally required, nor
wise.
So I am not concerned about the legal right of religious groups
or individuals to participate in the bioethics debate. But I am con-
cerned about how that right will be used. My concerns began in
1995 when I read a front page story in the New York Times report-
ing that leaders from more than eighty religious denominations had
20. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS
OF RELIGION IN POLITICS 20 (2000); see also MARTIN E. MARTY & JONATHAN
MOORE, POLITICS, RELIGION, AND THE COMMON GOOD: ADVANCING A DISTINCTLY
AMERICAN CONVERSATION ABOUT RELIGION'S ROLE IN OUR SHARED LIFE 44-45
(2000).
21. Kent Greenawalt, John Rawls, and Michael Perry are among the participants
in this debate. Greenawalt believes certain public officials should not publicly justify
decisions in religious terms. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Religion and American Politi-
cal Judgments, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 401, 410 (2001). Rawls argues that religious
justifications should not be used when society is addressing fundamental structural
questions. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 10 (1993). Perry takes a view that
is "more congenial to the airing of religious arguments" than either Greenawalt's or
Rawl's; he would typically allow public officials and other citizens to rely on religious
arguments. MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND
MORAL PERSPECTIVES 61 (1997); see also Michael J. Perry, Why Political Reliance on
Religiously Grounded Morality is not Illegitimate in a Liberal Democracy, 36 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 217, 229-34 (2001).
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issued a statement opposing the patenting of human genes.22 I
read the statement, studied its background, and, to make a long
story short, I was shocked.23 Not because of any disagreement
about patent law. The problem was that the religious leaders were
relying on a report that described genetics research as though it
changed everything. Genetic science, the report said, "explores the
essence of life."'2 4 It forces us "to examine, as never before, the
meaning of life,"2 5 it promises "to alter ... human nature,"26 and it
forces us to re-evaluate "determinism versus free will, the nature of
sin .... and the meaning of personhood. ' '27
These are remarkable sentiments. They would be remarkable
even if they were presented by an utterly secular speaker, since
someone with that point of view is typically aware that the environ-
ment, as well as heredity, plays a crucial role in human behavior.
One might expect that religious leaders would stress not only the
environment, but the possibility that humans exercise free will. Af-
ter all, the notion that human behavior can be described, at least in
part, as the result of antecedent causes did not come into being
with the Human Genome Project. Philosophers, theologians,
scientists, and others, ranging from Lucretius to Aquinas, from Spi-
noza to Freud, have worried about this matter for quite some time.
Descartes, in his Discourse on Method, imagined a mechanical
creature, physically identical to a human being, that was able to
dream, smell, taste, and speak, before concluding that such a crea-
ture would not be human because it would lack a soul.28 There is
nothing in the Human Genome Project that would change
Descartes' view.
I am afraid that the overreaction on the part of some religious
leaders to progress in genetics is not an isolated incident. Too
often, people of faith seem to be seduced by science; to believe that
science always has the most important things to say about the
human condition. Consider the recent movement to view prayer as
a form of medicine. Now praying may in fact sometimes improve
22. Edmund L. Andrews, Religious Leaders Prepare to Fight Patents on Genes,
N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1995, at Al.
23. Steven Goldberg, Gene Patents and the Death of Dualism, 5 S. CAL. IN-
TERDISC. L.J. 25, 33-34 (1996) (discussing the history of the statement, which traces its
origins to a report of the General Conference of the Methodist Church).
24. THE BOOK OF RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH 331 (1992).
25. See id.
26. See id. at 330.
27. See id. at 329.
28. BRUCE MAZLISH, THE FOURTH DISCONTINUITY: THE COEVOLUTION OF
HUMANS AND MACHINES 22-24 (1993).
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your health. But it can serve many other purposes as well, includ-
ing teaching us about our connections to other people and about
accepting what lies ahead of us, even when what lies ahead is
outside of our understanding and control. When we view prayer
only as medicine it becomes just another item on a list with aspirin
and acupuncture: useful for arthritis, not indicated for pancreatic
cancer. Religion is trivialized when it becomes just a minor branch
of science.
When I talk about my concern that clergy and religious spokes-
men are overemphasizing the possible use of prayer as medicine, I
am often met with amazement. Rabbis and ministers have asked
me, "What's wrong with using prayer as medicine if it cures peo-
ple?" Of course, there is nothing wrong with adding prayer to ex-
ercise, a healthy diet, and pills if all of these make us healthier.
Good doctors should be well aware of these possibilities if they are,
in fact, real possibilities. But I believe clergy have a calling that is
distinct from the medical profession. The fact that many of them
are eager to talk about petitionary prayer in terms of medical out-
comes and double blind studies is not good news. First of all, from
a theological point of view, prayer might not always work in a way
that can be measured by modern science. Secondly, and most im-
portantly, I would hope that clergy have a different agenda than
that of scientists.
Perhaps an analogy will make this more clear. Suppose a suita-
bly rigorous double blind study demonstrated that wheat grows tal-
ler if you play modern jazz within ten feet of the crop during the
growing season. That would be terrific news for people who are
interested in growing wheat, and I assume agricultural scientists
would follow up with studies to determine whether the trumpet
music of Wynton Marsalis or the saxophone music of Joshua
Redman is the more efficacious approach. But I would be shocked
and disappointed if Wynton Marsalis and Joshua Redman gave up
trying to produce better jazz and focused their efforts on deciding
what kind of music makes wheat grow. They are jazz musicians:
they have their own history, traditions, and goals that are quite dis-
tinct from growing wheat. I hope the clergy also have a mission
that is distinct from that of science.
Let me give another example where I believe modern religion
has been seduced by science. Consider the obsession some people
of faith have with finding scientific proof for the Biblical account of
creation. It is a commentary on our culture that we have a move-
ment called "creation science," as though science were the final
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arbiter of everything that matters. Creation science is not just bad
science, it is bad theology as well. Even if it were true, it would not
be a compliment to say that the Bible is a science text.
Part of the problem with giving science an unduly large role in
our thinking is that we then tend to believe that only those things
that are quantifiable are worthy of our attention. This perspective
is quite widespread in our society. As Gertrude Himmelfarb has
pointed out, we now see "the attempt of political philosophy to
transform itself into political science, history into social science, lit-
erary criticism into semiotics .. . ."I' Religious organizations
should stand against this tendency; they should not exemplify it.
The overarching point, and the one we have to keep in mind
when we consider the bioethics debate, is that science cannot gen-
erate our values and science should not set our agendas. Science
can tell us about what is, but not about what ought to be. Slavery's
existence did not make it right. Similarly, the fact that something is
scientifically possible does not mean that it is desirable.
There is another, more subtle way that science tends to affect
public debate. The value system of science stresses progress, and
thus puts a tremendous emphasis on priority, that is, on being first
with a new discovery." The media have a similar interest in break-
throughs, so there are often remarkable headlines, suggesting that
amazing new energy sources and medicines are right around the
corner. The reality, of course, is often more mundane. The path
from science to useful technology is not always smooth; energy
sources produce waste, medicines have side effects; indeed, nuclear
energy is not too cheap to meter, and the war on cancer has yet to
succeed.31 There are times when focusing on the latest headline
misses the bigger point, the more persistent issues that always con-
front us. Again, people of faith should have a particular ability to
take the longer view. Science is not likely to eradicate all of our
needs, including our need to choose between good and evil, be-
tween right and wrong.
Of course the relationship of science to religion is more complex
than I have indicated here. There are various ways the two can
29. GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, MARRIAGE AND MORALS AMONG THE VICTORI-
ANS 92 (1986).
30. STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH: LAW AND SCIENCE IN AMERICA 3
(1994).
31. See id. at 1-5, 84-111.
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interact; they need not always be separate to survive.32 But surely
most of us would agree that science should not swallow religion.
I speak as someone who strongly supports basic scientific re-
search.33 And I believe that informed social policymaking often
requires that we non-scientists inform ourselves about recent dis-
coveries and their implications. It is not possible to make sensible
policy and moral decisions in a vacuum. But we should never as-
sume that the latest discovery changes everything. Often, on im-
portant social and moral issues, it changes very little.
Let me give an example that might be helpful in our further de-
liberations during this conference. One kind of issue that is often
overlooked when we read headlines about the latest discovery is
the question of how the benefits and costs of that discovery will be
distributed throughout our society. For example, will rich and poor
be affected equally; if not, is that a cause for concern? My focus on
distributional issues is not intended to force a liberal or a conserva-
tive bias on the question. Different religious and moral traditions
will have different teachings about the role of individual responsi-
bility, the coercive power of the state, our obligations to others,
and so on. The point is that applying those teachings can greatly
enhance the quality of our individual and social choices.
Let me give you an imaginary case to try to give you a sense of
what I am talking about. Suppose that next Monday's New York
Times reports that scientists at Johns Hopkins, drawing on sophisti-
cated new genetic techniques, have developed a remarkable new
pill. This pill, taken exactly once a week for twelve weeks, will
reduce by fifty percent the odds that you will contract cancer of
any kind. The only side effect is that it will increase by ten percent
the odds that you will someday suffer a fatal stroke. Each pill costs
one thousand dollars, so the total cost is $12,000.
I am sure that many sermons the following weekend will talk
about this pill. The clergymen will want to make sure their congre-
gations know that their leader is up to date, that he reads the New
York Times, and that he studies all medical diagrams contained
therein. I hope the sermons will mention that not all apparently
dramatic advances actually pan out. More importantly I hope
32. Ian G. Barbour has identified four ways that science and religion can relate to
each other: conflict, independence, dialogue, and integration, IAN G. BARBOUR, RE-
LIGION AND SCIENCE: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 77-105 (1997). John
F. Haught, in a similar vein, speaks of conflict, contrast, contact, and confirmation.
JOHN F. HAUGHT, SCIENCE AND RELIGION: FROM CONFLICT TO CONVERSATION 9,
204-05 (1995).
33. See GOLDBERG, supra note 30, at 183.
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there will be time in the sermons to talk about the distributional
issues the pill raises. They are, after all, pretty obvious. They con-
cern not only the $12,000 cost but also the fact that not everyone
will learn from the newspapers that the pill exists, what its side
effects are, and precisely how often one has to take it.
Our society usually has two automatic reactions to these distri-
butional issues. One approach is the individualistic one: people
should be responsible for learning about and paying for the pill on
their own. If you believe you are more at risk from stroke than
cancer then you might decide not to take the pill; the choice is
yours. If you miss a dose, that is your responsibility. And, of
course, paying for the pill is up to you. The other approach empha-
sizes the role of government: tax dollars should be used to educate
people about the pill, its risks, and the method for taking it. And
tax money might be used to subsidize low income citizens who
want to take the pill. The government could even choose to raise
taxes enough to make the pill available to everyone at no cost.
As I have indicated, traditional religious perspectives may have
an important contribution to make on these issues. Traditional
teachings on the role of individual responsibility, the desirability of
educating others, and the obligation to help the poor may all be
relevant here, and those teachings should be explored every bit as
much as the chemical structure of the pill is explored.
But let me suggest that traditional religious perspectives might
point us in an additional direction. Modern economics and politi-
cal science may focus primarily on the individual and the state, but
surely religion often cares greatly about intermediate institutions,
such as the family, the community, and the church itself. In the
United States today, it is quite possible that the government's deci-
sion will be that the availability of this pill should be left largely to
the workings of the free market, with a patchwork of subsidies
through programs like Medicare and Medicaid, and a patchwork of
public education programs in hospitals and clinics. Under this ap-
proach many people will not be able to afford the pill or will not be
well informed about its risks and how to take it.
I can imagine religious groups stepping in and making a distinc-
tive contribution here. Some faiths may teach a particular respon-
sibility to family members; indeed, there may be a responsibility to
sacrifice to make sure that your brothers and sisters have the
knowledge and the resources they need so that they can make a
meaningful decision whether to take the pill. Even more strikingly,
some churches may conclude that they have a similar responsibility
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to their entire membership in the United States and abroad. Such
a church may decide that it should sacrifice to help its own mem-
bers who lack the resources or the knowledge to decide whether to
use the pill. And of course some religious groups may chose to use
their resources to help others of every faith obtain the opportunity
to use the pill.
Religious groups can and should debate these issues. And they
should do so not just when an anti-cancer pill is discovered at Johns
Hopkins. In fact, you can give this kind of sermon and have this
kind of debate even in the absence of a new discovery. Because
these are timeless issues-not easy issues, but timeless ones-and
they are relevant to real medicines and medical procedures that
exist today. In fact, these issues are and have been relevant for
millennia to the distribution of food and education.
Bioethics is going to confront us with new challenges. But some
of those challenges can be met with some very old tools.
E 7
